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Book Review
Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy, Patricia Smith Churchland. Cambridge Massachusetts and
London England,: A Bradford Book, MIT Press, 2002. i-xii,+ 471pp., ISBN 0-262-53200-X (paperback).
In reading the book under review, I was reminded of a lecture I heard by a prominent psychologist. As I
recall it, the main point was that pigeons are better able to recognize particular persons at certain large
distances than people are able to do. Pigeons can even identify particular people in various disguises at
relatively great distances when people are unable to do so. The explanation seemed fairly straightforward:
pigeons have visual capabilities that exceed ours because of the makeup of their eyes. Simply put, they
are better able than we to make finer discriminations at greater distances. Thus comparative anatomy and
physiology helped one to understand the greater discriminatory abilities of pigeons compared to humans
in certain contexts.
Patricia Churchland, along with others, has long believed and argued that understanding our neurology
will enable us to understand better some of what we are, what we can and cannot do, etc. On this point,
and to the extent that it applies, I think we are well advised to yield to developments here. What we must
be on guard against, it seems to me, is overextension or overdevelopment of what is to be gained by such
advances in such knowledge of the innards of human beings.
At her most cautious, Churchland sees neurological knowledge as being a valuable ally in understanding
various human states, activities, ways of behaving, etc. At her boldest, she sees such knowledge as
replacing, supplanting, improving upon, rejecting as too “folk psychological” much current putative
knowledge about ourselves. And it is with respect to the bolder thesis that readers are likely to engage or
disengage with a kind of passion. The more cautious view seems to me to be only good sense: if a
domain of human knowledge offers additional valuable knowledge, then one would be churlish,
dogmatic, unwise, imprudent, etc. to ignore, overlook, or reject same. But the bolder view has the look
of a program, a commitment to a method, the potential for dogmatic insistence on prioritization of
scientific knowledge above and denigration of all other knowledge, etc. Strawson, well aware that we
might give both scientific and more personalized accounts or stories of others and ourselves, once
remarked in his book Skepticism and Naturalism about the innuendo of inferiority of “folk psychology:”
"Each story will invoke its own explanatory connections, the one in terms of neurophysiological
and anatomical laws, the other in terms of what is sometimes called, with apparently pejorative
intent, “folk psychology”; i.e., the ordinary explanatory terms employed by diarists, novelists,
biographers, historians, journalists and gossips, when they deliver their accounts of human behavior
and experience----the terms employed by such simple folk as Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Proust and
Henry James."
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I wish to endorse Strawson’s caution in contrasting so adversely scientific accounts and more everyday
accounts of humans and their lives.
Take mental illness, for example, and its treatment both in terms of medications and counseling/therapy.
I choose this example because on the one hand some significant progress in the neurology and biology of
the brain has occurred in recent decades. This progress is one huge impetus for Churchland’s work, here
and elsewhere. In contrast, I think some of what is appropriately called interpersonal psychodynamics is
nowhere close to being understood in neurological terms, and the likelihood that we will both be
interested in determining, and able to determine, such neurological intricacies of interpersonal
interactions is, I think, extremely remote. I aim to highlight these contrasts in what follows, thereby
shedding light on what is and what is not helpful about neurophilosophy.
The progress we have made in recent decades in medications for such ailments as schizophrenia is
impressive. We are in an era where many view mental illness as [to a significant extent? primarily?
exclusively?] a matter of biology. The phrase ‘broken brains’ has come into somewhat accepted parlance,
even in book titles, about such matters. Here, too, I think we are well advised to yield to developments in
knowledge of brain chemistry/biology/anatomy/physiology. At the same time, overextension or
overdevelopment of discoveries here can lead as well as mislead.
Suppose one is a mental health professional doing an initial interview of a client/patient. How is one to
distinguish, during that first interview especially, but also as one gets to know the client/patient better,
between symptoms of a disorder, traits that indicate a personality, and traits that are characteristic of that
person only during certain kinds of stress or only in certain kinds of stressful circumstances? Do
ponderings about the origins and nature of the cosmos indicate pathology, philosophical bent, or higher
education with a major in philosophy or religious studies----or, of course, some combination of these or
something else? Making these distinctions is vitally important for the basics of understanding the person
one is getting to know. And making the distinctions might be aided by neurological knowledge, now or
in the future. At the same time, our current best methods for making such distinctions strike me as
involving, and involving essentially, getting to know a person better and better. Such knowledge is at
best assisted or aided by neurology and not supplanted by it. Furthermore, having made progress in
making the above distinctions, one is faced with numerous questions: ought one to prescribe medication
and if so which one[s] and in what doses?, how ought one to treat such a person in future meetings, i.e.,
sustained interpersonal interactions of the sort involved in talking therapy? These issues are not very
likely to be a matter of mere neurological knowledge and this for a variety of reasons. Not knowing the
person well, one doesn’t know what “works” and does not work for her/him. Moreover, one’s training is
a factor in the therapeutic approaches one will rely on, as are one’s inventiveness and boldness in both
implementing and departing from that training. The relevant variables are not merely physiological ones,
but involve other kinds of knowledge, including not just prudential knowledge but ethical and even legal
knowledge as well.
What I have written above is meant to be uncontroversial: helping another person involves both getting
to know her/him in a variety of ways and with varieties of knowledge that one brings to the interaction. It
also involves knowing or at least believing in some ways that one ought/ought not to treat others
generally, as well as knowing/having beliefs about how one ought/ought not to treat the particular person
sitting opposite one and who seeks assistance in addressing particular “problems of living.” Telling
someone that her/his brain is “broken” or that her/his neurons are “misfiring” or that there are certain
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chemical imbalances or deficiencies raises apprehension in patients and clients that they’re not even
being understood or given empathy, no matter the truth of such assertions. A psychiatrist has told a good
friend of mine that he, my friend, refuses to accept the diagnosis of mental illness that the doctor has
provided. But it is also true that the doctor has refused to accept my friend’s account of both how he got
into such states, of what such states amount to for him, and why he lacks certain skills in the situations
life has offered him. The doctor simply urges emphatically the need for the medication and the diagnosis,
telling my friend: you have a disease, “you just don’t get it.” I have suggested that my friend reply in
some way like this: I have told you my life story of how I got to be where and how I am and why I have
certain difficulties in living, “you just don’t get it.” I think that there is considerable merit in taking
BOTH views seriously and as expressing truthful accounts and NOT insisting on the truth of one account
over and against the truth of the other.
Refinements in knowledge of physiology are not likely to alter some of the issues of interpersonal
dynamics, even if that knowledge might in some ways enable one to negotiate certain areas better than
previously. Here I think of another psychiatrist who told me that current drugs for schizophrenia lead him
to the view that he does more total or net good dispensing drugs to many more patients with monthly 10-
15 minute drug maintenance interviews than his longer conversations ever did for far fewer patients. At
the same time, he thinks that his patients are better off without thereby getting better, that they still face
varied major personal problems more on their own than when they could discuss them at greater length
with him. He spoke of a clear tradeoff here: they were better able with medication to face problems than
without the medication, but now they had to face them more on their own than previously. This shows,
to put it overly simply, that there is a lot to life besides the neurology of life.
Of course if use of drugs enhances therapy, then there is much to recommend such use. It is even a fact
of modern medical practice that major psychiatric ailments are considerably alleviated, or rather at least
their symptoms are alleviated, by modern medicines. Sometimes patients see a psychiatrist just for so-
called drug maintenance visits where very little interpersonal interaction is even possible. This is partly
due to the costs of other alternatives, the cost effectiveness of talking therapy vs. drug therapy [as implied
by the psychiatrist’s remarks above]. This is not to mention the priority of matters other than mental
health [e.g., billions and billions of dollars for military activities] chosen by legislators, other leaders, and
society at large. But does anyone seriously believe that in principle drugs could replace all of therapy,
that we will or would want to develop drugs that would replace what is important and valuable in person-
to-person relationships? In other words, is it plausible to believe that ingestion will replace---rather than
affect---social interaction? People ravaged by illnesses and/or difficulties in living need far more than
medication even if and when restored to what we declare to be normalcy. They may need to learn or
relearn skills never possessed or lost during bouts of illness, to change career goals, to learn how to
mend broken relationships or how to put them behind one effectively, etc. I, for one, do not think we are
likely to develop skills by developing new medications that will “give” skills to those lacking them.
Learning has neurological components, to be sure. But there are many relevant non-neurological
variables involved in learning as well.
There are even some special problems raised about neurophilosophy in the therapeutic context on the
matter of authority. What if physiology indicates one range of psychological states in a subject but the
subject reports things differently? Will we, when will we, should we, use physiology to override self-
descriptions? These issues arise both with respect to oneself and others. This seems to be a cluster of
problems not at all easy to address. We generally invest persons’ self-reports of their mental states,
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attitudes, motivations, etc. with a kind of strong authority, assuming that they are “normal” or at least
reliable reporters in other ways. And, it is worth noting, even unreliable reporters can simultaneously
deliver both some reliable and some unreliable reports. The platitude that sometimes even the paranoid
person is followed or persecuted says as much by understatement. What do we do then about accepting
persons’ reports, especially self-reports?
An old philosophical chestnut lurks here and arises several times in Churchland’s text. It is easier for an
observer than for the subject herself to dismiss the subject's reports as reporting "mere" appearances.
Science has often urged its explanations of appearances as referring to the replacements for those
appearances. I am urging that we are, and that we should continue to be, leery of doing so in a large
variety of cases. It may be valuable to hold onto both the intrapersonal appearances as reported and the
reality science introduces to explain them. This point is both general enough and important enough that I
think it bears repeating.
More than once, Churchland raises the appearance/reality distinction, inclining it seems to me to both
embrace it and to reject it ultimately by saying that the sciences enable us to get at the reality involved.
On the one hand, she sees the importance of the phenomena for which we seek explanations, often
scientific explanations to be sure. On the other hand, she inclines to the view that the scientific
explanations can and may [simply] replace the talk, conceptualization, and concern with truth[s] about
phenomena. I believe that sometimes this is the correct maneuver. I also lean toward the view sometimes
this would be to identify what is distinct. Sometimes the phenomena for which we seek explanation[s]
and the explanation[s] are often two things, not one, and so there is no call, license or, on this view of
the matter, even temptation to say that what the explanations mention are all that there is.
My concerns about therapy/counseling and neural knowledge and even neurophilosophy stem from [a]
my sympathy toward each and [b] the desire to take the best of each and develop a program incorporating
these in a program of best practices for responding to needs in the mental health areas. I am especially
reluctant to force an exclusive choice here. And it’s not so much that Churchland would have me do so
always and everywhere as that at points in her book she treats certain issues in that manner. So excited is
she by the recent discoveries and current prospects of additional discoveries that she sometimes seems to
focus on the development in the scientific domain to the minimalization or exclusion of interpersonal
dynamics, the appearances that are involved in them and elsewhere in the phenomena with which we all
deal daily. I’m leery of that exclusive focus on science on many grounds and would hope that those who
use the book as the kind of introductory text it is written to be take the time to caution readers that often
there are options other than those that Churchland lays before readers. Indeed, enabling readers to see
distinctions such as that between the bolder thesis and the tamer one with which I began can make
Churchland’s text be useful in ways she did not intend without detracting from the usefulness that she
did intend. In other words, a savvy instructor less partial to neurophilosophy than Churchland could be
ingenious in illustrating where and how this new methodology can be so important and helpful while also
calling attention to its limitations. This is what I have tried to do in a very brief and general way in this
review.
By offering an introduction to philosophy through the lens of neurophilosophy, Churchland risks
slighting various aspects of the discipline. One will not find much about multicultural issues, feminism,
gender equity, etc. Nor will one find detailed treatment of some of the leading figures in the history of
the discipline. If anything, there is a tendency away from these because of the great interest in recent
developments, ongoing research, and future results from [Western?] science. Nonetheless, Churchland
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sees herself as continuing an Aristotelian approach. So what one might do in using this text would be to
combine it, in spite of its own considerable heft, with some traditional excerpts/readings, the better to
highlight how some see the discipline as changing, as losing in autonomy but gaining in authority as it
becomes more and more assimilated to scientific endeavor. Such assimilation has been in the air for
literally centuries, perhaps millennia. Churchland’s contemporary variety of such assimilation is therefore
one way to introduce students to philosophy and what remains of its autonomy in the thinking embodied
in neurophilosophy. Her book repeatedly demonstrates that Churchland is both a worthy ally and a
worthy opponent.
Donald Sievert
University of Missouri
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